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ELIMINATING PREDATORY LITIGATION IN THE
CONTEXT OF BASELESS TRADE SECRET
CLAIMS: THE NEED FOR A MORE AGGRESSIVE
COUNTERATTACK
I. INTRODUCTION
Abuse of the judicial process is hardly a novel problem,
yet its impact in the area of trade secret litigation uncovers
particularly fascinating and unsettled issues. Consider, for ex-
ample, the following hypothetical situation. Motivated by a
falling-out with management over product development strat-
egy, several employees have left a large company to form a
competing business selling a similar product in the same mar-
ketplace. Outraged at this move and determined to stop the
new business in its tracks, management of the large company
immediately burdens the new company with a hefty lawsuit.
The lawsuit includes allegations that the former employees
misappropriated valuable trade secrets from their former em-
ployer, and seeks an injunction to prohibit the new company
from continuing operation.1
The employer may indeed have a valid claim. However,
its evaluation of the trade secret claim and the loss it will suf-
fer at the hands of the departing employees is often colored
by emotion.2 In these situations, litigation instigated by the
former employer can be used as an anti-competitive tool.$ Es-
tablished companies sometimes pursue a baseless trade secret
lawsuit4 for the purpose of harassing or eliminating an incipi-
0 1983 by Elizabeth Smith
1. This hypothetical is a composite of a more detailed one created by attorney
James Pooley in his book, J. POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS 105-10 (1982), in order to illus-
trate the anatomy of a trade secret case.
2. Thomajon, Trade Secrets: Settle or Sue?, 6 LITIGATION 37 (1980).
3. J. POOLEY, supra note 1, at 104.
4. A precise definition of what constitutes a "baseless lawsuit" depends, in part,
on the nature of the claim being made. In the context of "baseless or vexatious trade
secret infringement" claims, the meaning implied by preterm focuses on proceedings
instituted: (1) without probable cause for a reasonable belief in the merit of the
claim, and (2) for the purpose of harassing and annoying a competitor and interfering
with its business relationships.
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ent competitor." The new company is forced to utilize its lim-
ited capital and manpower to fend off the baseless lawsuit in-
stead of developing its product, and thus may be effectively
prevented from entering the market during a crucial "start-
up" period.6
This comment will address the unresolved problem of
how to eliminate the availability of the judicial process to bus-
iness entities that pursue baseless trade secret misappropria-
tion lawsuits for the purpose of harassing or eliminating a
competitor. First, it will briefly explain the background and
elements of the trade secret cause of action. Second, it will
identify how groundless trade secret claims can be used to
drain an incipient competitor's resources, thereby preventing
the new company from entering the marketplace. Third, the
existing defensive tactics available to a defendant will be as-
sessed. Fourth, the author will enumerate the policy consider-
ations that support the view that a more effective deterrent is
needed to eliminate the unfair business tactics of entities that
initiate groundless trade secret claims. Finally, given the sup-
port of these policies, and the inability of existing remedies to
effectively deter meritless trade secret claims, the author pro-
poses that a new cause of action be allowed as a business tort
under the unfair competition laws.7
5. J. POOLEY, supra note 1, at 104.
6. The term "start-up" period refers to the beginning stages of a company's
entry into a market. During this period, the company's ability to survive is usually
highly dependent upon the availability of financing and the projection of a favorable
image to the public. Interview with James Pooley, Esq., of Mosher, Pooley, Sullivan
& Hendren, Palo Alto, Cal. (Jan. 5, 1983).
7. It is important to note briefly the conflicting social interests which must be
balanced in developing alternatives to remedy this problem of vexatious litigation. On
the one hand is the employer's interest in preventing the unjust enrichment of com-
petitors by protecting valuable business information it develops, and society's interest
in providing economic incentive for continued innovation. McBrearty, Antitrust
Treatment of Competitive Torts: An Argument for a Rule of Per Se Legality Under
the Sherman Act, 58 TEx. L. REv. 415, 417 (1980). On the other hand there is the
employee's interest in economic mobility and personal freedom (von Kalinauski, Key
Employees and Trade Secrets, 47 VA. L. REv. 583, 599 (1961)), the new company's
right to survive, and society's interest in encouragement of competition and the dis-
couragement of monopoly. In addition, there is the public policy against unfair busi-
ness practices, particularly schemes abusively employing the judicial process. For a
meaningful discussion of the competing policy considerations involved in trade secret
litigation, see generally R. MILGRAM, TRADE S.caairs, ch. 7 (1983).
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II. THE TRADE SECRET CAUSE OF ACTION
Before illustrating the potential for abuse inherent in the
trade secret misappropriation claim, it is necessary to briefly
explain the background and elements of the trade secret cause
of action. The trade secret cause of action is an equitable rem-
edy which arose under the unfair competition laws. This
claim developed out of the desire to allow the protection of
ideas which the inventor is unable to safeguard under the
copyright or patent laws.9 The basic philosophy underlying
this cause of action is that where the inventor takes reasona-
ble precautions to keep confidential the ideas it develops, the
unauthorized use or disclosure of those ideas by another con-
stitutes a breach of trust that is actionable under the unfair
competition laws. 10
Although what constitutes a trade secret is not subject to
a simple definition,1" courts in many jurisdictions rely on the
definition provided by the Committee on Torts of the Ameri-
can Law Institute as a guideline. It provides in pertinent part:
"A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or
combination of information which is used in one's business,
and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage
over competitors who do not know or use it.' 2 Thus, a trade
secret "may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process
of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern
for a machine or other device, or a list of customers."'"
Although no single formulation for imputing liability for
trade secret misappropriation has been universally accepted,
courts generally agree that the plaintiff's prima-facie case re-
quires proof of the following three elements by a preponder-
ance of the evidence: (1) the existence of a trade secret, (2)
the access or acquisition of the trade secret by a third party
by unfair means or by an employee under an obligation of
confidentiality, and (3) the use or disclosure (or imminent use
or disclosure) by that person of the trade secret to the trade
secret owner's detriment." At the initial stage of the litigation
8. See infra text accompanying notes 170-79.
9. 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 5306 (1974).
10. Id.
11. von Kalinauski, supra note 7, at 587.
12. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
13. R. MILGRAM, supra note 7, at §2.01, 2-6 to 2-7.
14. Hutter, Trade Secret Misappropriation: A Lawyer's Practical Approach to
10971983]
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the plaintiff need only show a reasonable certainty that it
would succeed at trial-not a conclusive showing that it will
ultimately prevail."5 In order to prevail, however, the plaintiff
must develop a fairly reliable factual basis for its claims and
may not rely upon conclusory allegations. 6
The defendant need not remain inactive as to the ele-
ments which the plaintiff has the burden of proof. The defen-
dant may negate, by way of affirmative defense, each of the
elements which the plaintiff has alleged and seeks to prove."
Given the foundational elements of the plaintiff's prima
facie case, the "baseless" trade secret claim on which this
comment focuses can be defined as the instigation or contin-
ued pursuit of a trade secret claim absent probable cause for a
reasonable belief in the existence of the requisite elements. As
will be discussed below, the inherent difficulty in detecting
baseless trade secret claims stems from the amorphous nature
of the required elements. The distinction between "legiti-
mate" and "baseless" trade secret misappropriation claims is,
admittedly, a subtle one. Nonetheless, some general guidelines
have been established."8
the Case Law, 1 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 1, 9 (1978). See also Hutter, Pursuing Ex-
Employees Who Misappropriate Trade Secrets: Pretrial Considerations, 6 LITIGA-
TION 39 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hutter, Pretrial].
15. Hutter, Pretrial, supra note 14, at 41.
16. See, e.g., Summit Elec. Co. v. Mayrent, 17 Ill. App. 3d 545, 308 N.E.2d 313
(1974).
17. R. MILGRAM, supra note 7, at 7-117. One commentator notes:
Depending upon the peculiar facts of the case, one or more of the fol-
lowing may be appropriate:
The information in dispute was obtained by the corporate defen-
dant other than from the defendant employee.
The information plaintiff seeks to protect is not secret, but is in the
public domain.
The former employee was under no obligation of secrecy, either be-
cause plaintiff made no effort to keep its information confidential, or
because it made no effort to elicit a secrecy pledge from the former em-
ployee, or because it sought such a pledge and it was explicitly rejected,
or some combination of these. Counsel must, of course, be mindful that
the obligations of that employee may depend heavily upon the degree of
fiduciary quality in his former employment.
Plaintiff sought to impose secrecy, but did so on such a broad basis,
covering nonsensitive as well as sensitive matters, that public policy
would be offended by unreasonable inhibition of employee movement.
Zamore, Defending Trade Secret Litigation, 6 LITIGATION 44, 47 (1980).
18. 61 CAL. JuR. 3D 55-56 (1980). That section provides:
As a general rule courts will protect the use of confidential information
acquired by an employee in the course of his employment. . . . Thus, a
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III. BASELESS TRADE SECRET CLAIMS. AS OFFENSIVE WEAPONS
Central to the problem of the use of baseless trade secret
claims to harass or eliminate competitors is the economics of
litigation. The tactic of using sham litigation as an offensive
weapon is likely to find success only where a relatively large
plaintiff sues a comparatively smaller defendant. This is due
to the fact that the cost of a lawsuit will be much more of a
burden for a small company than for a large one, and thus the
smaller firm is more likely to be driven out of the market. 9
This differential in size between the plaintiff and defendant
frequently exists in the context of trade secret litigation. In
the typical case, the plaintiff is the former employer, a large
well-established company, and the defendant is a smaller en-
terprise founded by a group of ex-employees. Given this dis-
crepancy in size, it is easily understood why the defendant
trying to start a new company is at a tremendous disadvan-
tage when faced with litigation costs.
Clearly, the expense of litigation may operate as a weapon
for the plaintiff in a trade secret lawsuit. By filing trade secret
misappropriation suits against former employees, regardless of
merit, large companies can tie up the smaller "start-up" com-
panies in uncertain and expensive proceedings.
20
One reason for the expense of the litigation stems from
the highly technical issues involved. Inevitably, both the
plaintiff and defendant are forced to engage the services of
former employer will be protected against the unwarranted disclosure
and unconscionable use by a former employee of trade secrets and confi-
dential business communications .... However, some knowledge
gained by an employee is of such a general nature that equity will not
restrict its later use .... Consequently, a former employee is privileged
to use in competition with his former employer techniques learned from
the latter that are merely methods of doing business and processes that
are but skilled variations of general processes known to the particular
trade.
Id.
19. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 348
(1978).
20. Balmer, Sham Litigation and the Antitrust Laws, 13 INTELL. PROP. L. REv.
529 (1980).
For example, in one recent case a new entrant into a sophisticated
branch of electronics production was sued by the dominant firm in the
market for alleged theft of trade secrets. Although only three months
elapsed between the filing of the complaint and a settlement favorable
to the fledgling company, the new company ran up $50,000 in legal bills.
Id. at 554.
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highly paid consultants or experts.2 In addition to the ex-
pense involved in retaining experts, the cost of attorney's fees
alone creates large legal expenses.2"
Another manner in which a baseless trade secret suit may
be used to harm a new competitor is through the exploitation
of the adverse publicity it creates. This tactic is vividly illus-
trated by two leading cases, Mach-Tronics v. Zirpoli s and
Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co. 24 In Mach-Tronics Ampex
sued Mach-Tronics for alleged misappropriation of trade
secrets, and Mach-Tronics cross-complained against Ampex
for antitrust violations.2 5 Mach-Tronics alleged that Ampex
instituted its baseless trade secret suit as a part of its effort to
drive Mach-Tronics out of the market. e Further, it alleged
that Ampex proceeded to notify Mach-Tronics' customers and
suppliers of the suit, and falsely represented that the litiga-
tion had been decided in favor of Ampex.27 Finally, Ampex
allegedly threatened the customers and suppliers with eco-
21. J. PooLEY, supra note 1, at 109. The use of experts has been described as
follows:
Their advice is sought regarding technological issues and customer list
and employee raiding disputes. They document how easily an indepen-
dent customer list can be created, the relative importance of price and
other objective criteria in a particular market, and the ability of the
plaintiff to have avoided all damage by hiring replacement personnel.
Like psychiatrists at a criminal trial, experts in a trade secret case can
offer wildly different opinions on the same issue. Nevertheless, because
of the usually technical questions involved in such litigation, they are
practically indispensible and a trade secret case rarely can be tried with-
out them. Typically, the lawsuit requires at least two experts, one deal-
ing with issues of technology and the other an economist to testify as to
the harm which was caused, or could have been avoided by each side.
Id.
22. In trade secret cases attorneys frequently go to court before trial to resolve
interim disputes, including venue issues, objections to deposition questions, and the
availability of preliminary injunctive relief. Each appearance generates more docu-
ments and demands more attorney time, thereby increasing legal fees. Significant as-
pects of the trial can be affected by these motions, and the results are often difficult
to predict. Nonetheless, they consume time, add to the fees, and lengthen the time
before trial. J. PooLuw, supra note 1, at 109.
23. 316 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1963).
24. 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952).
25. The cross-complaint included allegations that Ampex "conspired and com-
bined with other manufacturers and distributors unlawfully to restrain trade in video
tape recorders and related components, patented and unpatented, by such means as:
division of markets; fixing and stabilizing of prices; cross-licensing of patents; and the
institution of baseless litigation against defendants." 316 F.2d at 822-23.
26. Id. at 822.
27. Id.
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nomic reprisals if they dealt with Mach-Tronics 2 8 The court
found that Ampex's anti-competitive activities constituted a
violation of antitrust law.2 9 In reaching its conclusion the
court relied on the case of Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co.,
where the Tenth Circuit dealt with a strikingly similar
situation.80
In Kobe the leading manufacturer of pump equipment,
Kobe, Inc., sued Dempsey Pump Co., a new company engaged
in manufacturing hydraulic pumps, for an alleged patent in-
fringement and misappropriation of trade secrets. Kobe then
proceeded to send a letter to the pump equipment customer
stating: "[I]t is our obligation to inform you of this pending
infringement action." The effects of Kobe's verbal and written
communications to customers in the pump industry were dis-
asterous to Dempsey.$1 A boycott of their products brought
their activities to a complete standstill.82 Dempsey denied the
validity of Kobe's patent infringement claims, as well as the
merit of the trade secret suit, and counter-claimed for treble
damages under the antitrust laws." The court held that Kobe
was guilty of unlawful monopolization under the Sherman Act
and awarded Dempsey treble damages.3 4 The Kobe court fo-
cused on the verbal and written statements made by Kobe to
the pump industry: "To hold that there was no liability for
damages caused by this conduct, though lawful in itself, would
permit a monopolizer to smother every potential competitor
with litigation before it had an opportunity to be otherwise
caught in its tentacles and leave the competitor without a
remedy." 5
The events in Kobe provide an excellent illustration of
how the adverse publicity associated with litigation may cause
a new company to lose existing and potential customers. An-
other detrimental effect of such litigation is that it may im-
pair the company's ability to obtain financing from venture
28. Id.
29. Id. at 831.
30. Id.
31. 198 F.2d at 422.
32. Id.
33. The defendants alleged abuse of the patent monopoly in violation of §§ 1
and 2 of the Sherman Anti-trust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-2, and counter-claimed for
triple damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 15. 198 F.2d at 418.
34. Id. at 425, 427.
35. Id.
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capitalists.
The drying up of financing opportunities impacts the new
company faced with a baseless lawsuit in two respects. First,
new companies typically have limited capital to work with at
the outset and thus rely heavily on venture capitalists and
banks to "get the operation off the ground. 37 Second, even
when there is no merit to the claim, the company is required
to expend money defending itself.38 Frequently, the new en-
terprise is also dependent upon venture capitalists to cover
the costs of the litigation."
Use of excessive or needless discovery provides another
means by which a plaintiff can harm a competitor in a base-
less trade secret suit. The discovery process allows the plain-
tiff to interfere substantially with the business operations of
the defendant. 40 This discovery takes many forms. It includes
depositions of employees from both sides, ranging from the
chief executive officer to the documents file clerk. In addition,
there will usually be hundreds of questions to be answered in
interrogatories as well as thousands of documents to
produce.4 1
The discovery process thus functions as a weapon in sev-
eral ways. First, it can be used to harass and aggravate the
36. J. POOLEY, supra note 1, at 104. This problem has been described as follows:
Using the unfair competition suit as a weapon against fledgling compa-
nies concerns those who organize and finance new businesses. Many ven-
ture capitalists will agree that in choosing between two otherwise equal
opportunities they will avoid the start-up company with potential litiga-
tion problems. These people seek "positive" deals where management
can focus undiverted attention on the new company's growth at the be-
ginning, when its chance of failure is so high. Ill-equipped to judge the
relative merits of litigation, potential investors are often scared away by
a plaintiff's requests; not just money, but an injunction against [the
defendants' ability to] manufactur[e] or [ship] products, or [employ]
particularly critical individuals. In one situation, a venture capitalist
abandoned financing a new company simply because he was named as a
"co-conspirator" in a trade secret complaint.
Id.
37. Interview with attorney James Pooley, supra note 6.
38. R. BORK, supra note 19, at 363.
39. Interview with attorney James Pooley, supra note 6. The problem of the
detrimental impact of a pending lawsuit on financing opportunities is by no means
unique to trade secret litigation. However, the unpredictability as to eventual out-
come associated with trade secret litigation makes it more difficult for the trade se-
cret defendant to convince potential financiers that the lawsuit against it is baseless.
40. J. POOLEY, supra note 1, at 108-09.
41. Id. at 108.
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defendant's customers and suppliers.4 2 Frequently, the plain-
tiff will depose all of the new company's customers and sup-
pliers.4 8 The aggravation of spending time in these proceed-
ings, and answering hundreds of questions often deters the
individuals from dealing with the new company in the fu-
ture.4 4 Second, the expense associated with the discovery pro-
ceedings can often be fairly significant.4 5 Third, the plaintiff
can tie up the defendant's key employees for several weeks,
forcing them to attend depositions and answer interrogato-
ries.46 Typically, the defendant, a new company, is likely to
have more limited manpower than the plaintiff, a well-estab-
lished enterprise. Thus, tying up employees in discovery pro-
ceedings is much more likely to result in a slowdown or even a
temporary halt in business for the defendant than for the
plaintiff.4 7
In addition to harassing the defendant through discovery,
trade secret plaintiffs will often be able to freeze a potential
competitor's entry into the marketplace by immediately seek-
ing a restraining order to prevent the defendant from using
the plaintiff's alleged trade secrets.4' Typically, plaintiffs will
request a restraining order without giving the defendant any
advance warning, in order to maintain the element of sur-
prise.4 9 Judges are usually reluctant to decide the factual is-
sues involved without a full hearing. Consequently, if a re-
straining order is requested without benefit of a hearing, the
judge will usually issue a temporary restraining order to
"maintain the status quo" until a hearing can be held. The
hearing to determine whether a preliminary injunction should
continue pending a full trial of the case is typically set for two
weeks later.50
It is at the preliminary injunction stage that many trade
secret cases are won or lost.5" If a preliminary injunction is
42. Id. at 109.
43. Id.
44. Interview with attorney James Pooley, supra note 6.
45. J. POOLEY, supra note 1, at 109. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying
text.
46. J. POOLEY, supra note 1, at 108-09.
47. Interview with attorney James Pooley, supra note 6.
48. J. POOLaY, supra note 1, at 106.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 107.
51. Hutter, Pretrial, supra note 14, at 39 (citing Midland-Ross Corp. v. Sun-
19831 1103
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granted, the scope of its restrictions can be critical to the de-
fendant.52 If the preliminary injunction significantly impacts
the business of the new company, the defendant's hands will
be tied, effectively preventing it from continuing with produc-
tion plans until after the conclusion of the litigation.5 3 Even
where the preliminary injunction is not granted, the time that
the defendant is forced to spend in fending off the lawsuit
functions as yet another weapon for the trade secret plaintiff.
A single, well-timed suit, with appeals, can cost a potential
competitor large amounts of time and money, even though the
suit may be completely frivolous.5
Often, because of the highly specialized and rapidly
changing technology involved, the defendant's delay in enter-
ing the market may mean the new company has lost a unique
opportunity to break into an industry." Baseless trade secret
claims thus become a useful tactic against incipient competi-
tors. It may be worth the price of litigation for the trade se-
cret plaintiff to purchase a delay of a year or more in a rival's
entry into a lucrative market.56
beam Equip. Corp., 316 F. Supp. 175 (W.D. Pa.), afl'd, 435 F.2d 159 (3rd Cir. 1970)).
To obtain preliminary relief, the plaintiff must persuade the court of at least three
things. First, that he is reasonably likely to succeed on the merits at a trial for final
injunctive relief in establishing the employee's liability for trade secret misappropria-
tion. This requires proof of: (1) the existence of a trade secret; (2) access to or acqui-
sition of the trade secret by the employee under an obligation of confidentiality; and
(3) the use or disclosure (or imminent use or disclosure) by the employee of the trade
secret.
Second, plaintiff must show that he will suffer immediate, irreparable injury if
the preliminary relief is not granted. Finally, plaintiff must show that, in balancing
the convenience and possible injuries to both parties, the "sides of equity" weigh in
his favor.
52. Hutter, Pretrial supra note 14, at 42. Hutter notes:
The scope of the preliminary injunction can be critical and deserves
careful consideration by both sides. Both plaintiff and defendant want
to have the trade secret defined in the injunction with some degree of
specificity; plaintiff because he wants to put the defendant on notice
about what he cannot do; and defendant because he wants to know what
he can and cannot do.
Id.
53. J. POOLEY, supra note 1, at 107.
54. Balmer, supra note 20, at 554.
55. Often, even if the defendant wins the trade secret case on the merits, due to
the time lag involved there may no longer be a demand for the new company's prod-
uct. The need may already have been met by another entrepreneur or the new com-
pany's product may have become obsolete. Interview with attorney James Pooley,
supra note 6.
56. R. BORK, supra note 19, at 348. The words of Judge Curtis, in Lee
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The above discussion describing how baseless lawsuits
can be used as weapons by trade secret plaintiffs has pointed
out the need to protect incipient competitors from meritless
trade secret misappropriation claims. The following discussion
will illustrate that there is presently no adequate device to
provide that protection.
IV. PRESENT COUNTER-ATTACKS AVAILABLE TO DEFENDANTS
FACED WITH BASELESS TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION
CLAIMS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
A. Procedural Defenses
The two fundamental procedural defenses developed to
prevent the abuse of the litigation process are the demurrer
and the summary judgment. The demurrer is a procedural de-
fense theoretically designed to prevent plaintiffs from litigat-
ing claims with no underlying merit.57 The summary judgment
is theoretically designed to prevent plaintiffs from litigating
claims where no material issue of fact exists.
8
The problems associated with determining whether a
plaintiff filing a trade secret suit has a valid cause of action
and the number of factual issues which usually must be liti-
gated stem from the loose definition given the term "trade se-
cret" and the wide variety of information and processes given
protection under trade secret laws59
Pharmaceuticals v. Den-Mat, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. 62, (62 D.C.C.D. Cal. 1976), accu-
rately summarize the vexatious character of some trade secret litigation:
This case, which at its inception involved issues of no great complexity,
has become a gigantic, grotesque monster of procedural strife which is
about to consume the parties and the court as well unless it can be
brought under some control. During the year and a half in which this
case has been pending, both parties have engaged in aggressive, abusive,
and harassing discovery, generating some twenty-six file folders of
pleadings. The court has been inundated with every conceivable type of
motion, and nearly every ruling of the court has been met with objec-
tions and motions for reconsideration. As a result, this court cannot help
but feel that the parties are more anxious to bring about the financial
collapse of their opposition than to move this case toward final solution.
Although evoked in the context of a patent dispute, this description is equally appli-
cable to baseless trade secret litigation. The issues in both patent and trade secret
cases are frequently complex, and the potential for abuse of the litigation process
through excessive discovery and motions is of paramount concern.
57. M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 108 (1972).
58. Id. at 117.
59. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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The basic definition does not inherently exclude from
protection any type of information; the determination to pro-
tect certain information as a trade secret is based upon the
facts of each case. 0 Thus, a major distinguishing feature of
trade secret litigation is the inability to predict exactly what
may happen until the facts are fully laid out in the court-
room. 1 This characteristic of trade secret litigation is one of
the major factors which renders both the demurrer and the
motion for summary judgment, the usual tools for eliminating
unwarranted litigation, ineffective in the context of trade se-
cret claims.2
1. Demurrer
A general demurrer allows the defendant to argue that
the plaintiff's complaint has failed to state a claim for relief or
a cause of action." In essence, the demurrer points to defects
on the face of the complaint." Thus, a defendant raising a
demurrer as a defense in a trade secret claim will argue that
the plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to establish the
existence of a trade secret or a valid claim for trade secret
misappropriation."
The goal of the trade secret plaintiff, however, is to keep
the pleadings and the proof as general and as vague as possi-
ble in order to avoid unnecessary disclosure of confidential in-
formation.6 Although the plaintiff's failure to define a trade
secret when so requested by a judge is sufficient grounds for
dismissing the action,7 often a base outline of information
about the trade secret, just enough to motivate the court to
60. Comment, Antitrust Implications Arising From The Use of Overly Broad
Restrictive Covenants for the Protection of Trade Secrets, 29 HASTINGS L. J. 297,
298-99.
61. J. POOLEY, supra note 1, at 105. "In most cases plaintiffs must construct a
web of perhaps ambiguous circumstantial evidence from which the trier of fact may
draw inferences which convince him that it is more probable than not that what
plaintiffs allege happened did in fact take place." Hutter, Pretrial, supra note 4, at 40
(quoting Greenberg v. Croydan Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806, 814 (E.D. Pa. 1974)).
62. Interview with attorney James Pooley, supra note 6.
63. M. GREEN, supra note 57.
64. Id.
65. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
66. Thomajon, supra note 2, at 38.
67. Seidel & Panitch, The Opening Stages of Trade Secret Litigation, 19 PiAc-
mcAx LAWYER 17, 22. See Package Mach. Co. v. Hayssen Mfg. Co., 164 F. Supp. 904
(E.D. Wis. 1958), af'd., 266 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1959).
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issue a preliminary injunction, is sufficient."
Thus, the desire to protect the confidentiality of the in-
formation alleged to be a trade secret gives plaintiffs a fair
amount of leeway in stating a cause of action.es Often, plain-
tiffs are allowed to simply refer to "know how" to which the
alleged misappropriator had access.70 Consequently, the abil-
ity of the demurrer to challenge the sufficiency of the plain-
tiff's complaint has been substantially undermined in the area
of trade secret disputes.
2. Summary Judgment
The motion for summary judgment is used to determine
whether the issues raised by the pleadings are substantial
enough to warrant a trial. 1 In order for a motion for summary
judgment to be granted, there must be no genuine issue of
material fact and the movant must be entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.7
One distinguishing feature of trade secret litigation, how-
ever, is that the facts of the case will determine the law. That
is, the facts will determine whether or not something is a
"trade secret." Therefore, there will rarely be "no issue of ma-
terial fact" in a trade secret case. Furthermore, various inter-
pretations of a given set of facts are often possible.7 8 Conse-
quently, the case usually comes down to both sides attempting
to persuade a judge or jury to accept their version of the
facts. 74 As illustrated by the case of Szczesny v. W.G.N. Con-
68. Thomajon, supra note 2, at 38. The ability to allege the existence of a trade
secret in rather general terms extends also to the requirements for obtaining prelimi-
nary injunctive relief. Although some courts require that the trade secret be specifi-
cally identified (see, e.g., Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F.2d 1108 (8th Cir.
1969)), and some specificity is required by Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, other courts issue broad and vague injunctions in trade secrets cases (see,
e.g., K & G Oil Tool & Serv. Co. v. G&G Fishing Tool Serv., 158 Tex. 594, 314 S.W.
2d 782 (1958) - injunction stopped defendants "from using in any way the confiden-
tial information obtained by defendants from an examination of plaintiffs product").
Hutter, Pretrial, supra note 14, at 42.
69. This interest in protecting the "secrecy" element of the information alleged
to be a trade secret is evidenced by the frequent use of protective orders requiring
that all proceedings be held in camera. See generally Seidel & Panitch, supra note
67.
70. Id. at 22.
71. M. GREEN, supra note 57, at 117.
72. M. KANE, supra note 63, at 138-39..
73. J. POOLEY, supra note 1, at 105.
74. Id.
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tinental Broadcasting Co.,75 courts are reluctant to grant de-
fendants' motions for summary judgment dismissing the com-
plaint unless the defendant can present compelling proof that
no material issue of fact exists.7
In view of the inherent limitations of traditional proce-
dural defenses, the following discussion will assess the sub-
stantive counterclaims which may be asserted by a defendant
burdened with a baseless trade secret claim.
B. Substantive Counterclaims
In the case where defendant's counsel believes in good
faith that the defendant has done nothing unlawful, and that
the trade secret misappropriation suit is merely an attempt to
inhibit or destroy the defendant as a legitimate competitor, an
aggressive counterclaim is the defendant's best strategy." The
counterclaims frequently asserted under tort law include
claims of interference with economic relations, such as injuri-
ous falsehood or trade defamation, interference with contrac-
tual relationships, interference with prospective economic ad-
vantage, and claims against tortious litigation, such as
malicious prosecution and abuse of process.78 In addition, de-
fendants can counterclaim under the federal Sherman Anti-
trust Act 79 for an attempt to monopolize or a conspiracy to
destroy a competitor in restraint of trade. Alternatively, trade
secret defendants may elect to counterclaim against the plain-
tiff under equivalent state antitrust statutes.80
The list of counterclaims set forth above appears to pro-
vide the trade secret defendant who has been burdened with a
baseless lawsuit with a number of alternative remedies. How-
ever, the availability of the cause of action is often curtailed
by the facts of the particular case. Furthermore, even when
the trade secret defendant prevails on a counterclaim, the re-
75. 20 Ill. App. 3d. 607, 315 N.E.2d 263 (1974).
76. 315 N.E.2d at 268-69. Although it dealt with a copyright infringement claim,
Szczesny is indicative of the reluctance of courts to grant defendants' motions for
summary judgment in trade secret disputes. Both trade secret and copyright disputes
revolve around sticky factual determinations, thus courts in both areas are not in-
clined to grant defendants' requests for summary judgment.
77. Zamore, supra note 17, at 46.
78. J. POOLEY, supra note 1, at 108.
79. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976).
80. See, e.g., The Cartwright Antitrust Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700-
16760 (West 1964 & Supp. 1983).
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lief afforded under many of these causes of action may fail to
provide full compensation for the losses sustained in defend-
ing the baseless lawsuit.
1. Interference with Economic Relations
Just as the cause of action for trade secret misappropria-
tion developed under the laws of unfair competition,81 so too
did the tort claims recognizing certain unlawful interferences
with economic relations.62 These causes of action include
trade defamation, interference with contractual relations, and
interference with prospective economic advantage.83
a. Trade Defamation
If the plaintiff in a trade secret case has made improper,
disparaging statements about the defendant to other persons
in the industry in which plaintiff and defendant compete, the
defendant may assert a counterclaim for trade defamation.
Also referred to as "injurious falsehood," this cause of action
resembles personal defamation.8 4 However, it is materially dif-
ferent due to the greater burden of proof resting on the trade
defamation plaintiff. In the case of personal slander, there is a
presumption that the disparaging statement is false. However,
the plaintiff in a trade defamation suit has the burden of
proving the falsity of the disparaging statement.8 "
In order to recover under a counterclaim for trade defa-
mation, the trade secret defendant must show that: (1) the
trade secret plaintiff published derogatory material about the
trade secret defendant; (2) the trade secret plaintiff distrib-
uted the material to third persons; (3) the publication played
a material and substantial part in inducing third persons not
to deal with the trade secret defendant; and (4) as a result of
these events, the trade secret defendant has suffered special
81. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
82. 61 CAL. JUR. 3D, supra note 18, at 25. See infra notes 170-79 and accompa-
nying text.
83. 61 CAL. JUR. 3D, supra note 18, at 25. In focusing on these causes of action,
it should be pointed out that "the recognition that [business] relationships are enti-
tled to protection against unreasonable interference is on the whole a comparatively
recent development." W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 915 (4th ed.
1971).
84. W. PRossER, supra note 83, at 920.
85. Id.
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damages."6Even in cases where blatant disparagement of the
trade secret defendant's business has been shown, the "special
damages" requirement seriously inhibits the potential useful-
ness of this counterclaim to the trade secret defendant. Spe-
cial damages refers to a pecuniary loss. 7 The trade secret de-
fendant will often experience a severe decline in business as a
result of disparaging statements.8 However, the difficulty in
establishing the special damages element is that most courts
do not regard a general decline in business as sufficient proof
of special damages.8 " The trade secret defendant is required to
establish a causal connection between the decline in business
and the disparaging statement.90 As a general rule the trade
secret defendant seeking relief under a counterclaim for trade
defamation is required to identify particular purchasers who
have refrained from dealing with it as a result of the disparag-
ing statement, and to specify the transactions of which it
claims to be deprived.9' The inherent difficulty in proving the
loss of particular business transactions, particularly with a
start-up company, is obvious. The result of this rather strict
rule regarding proof of damages, therefore, is that it is very
difficult for the trade secret defendant to recover damages
under a counterclaim for trade defamation.
b. Interference with Contractual Relations
Apart from trade defamation, the defendant faced with a
baseless trade secret claim may have a counterclaim against
the trade secret plaintiff for interference with contractual re-
lationships. The cause of action for interference with contrac-
tual relationships is classified by modern courts as a species of
interference with prospective economic advantage and re-
quires five elements: (1) a valid existing contract; (2) defen-
dant's knowledge of the contract and intent to induce breach;
(3) a contract breached in fact, or whose performance was ren-
86. Id.
87. Id. at 922.
88. See, e.g., Kobe, 198 F.2d 416. The defendant's business came to almost a
complete standstill as a result of the plaintiff's disparaging publication to defendant's
customers.
89. W. PROSSER, supra note 83, at 923. See, e.g., Shaw Cleaners & Dyers v. Des
Moines Dress Club, 215 Iowa 1130, 245 N.W. 231 (1932); Ward v. Gee, 61 S.W.2d 555
(Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
90. W. PROSSER, supra note 83, at 923.
91. See, e.g., Barkhorn v. Adlib Assoc., 203 F. Supp. 121 (D. Hawaii 1962).
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dered more difficult; (4) causation; and (5) actual damage. In
the context of baseless trade secret suits, this tort allows the
trade secret defendant to counterclaim against the trade se-
cret plaintiff when the actions of the trade secret plaintiff
have led customers to breach their contracts with the trade
secret defendant or when the trade secret defendant's per-
formance has been rendered impossible. 3
The limited usefulness of the cause of action for interfer-
ence with contractual relations as a counterclaim for the trade
secret defendant stems from the requirement that the damage
suffered by the trade secret defendant take the form of a
breached contract.9 Since the trade secret defendant is usu-
ally a start-up company, it is unlikely to have many existing
contracts. Hence, in practice the cause of action for interfer-
ence with contractual relations is frequently unavailable to
trade secret defendants as a counterclaim.
c. Interference with Prospective Economic
Advantage
The remaining business tort available to the trade secret
defendant as a counterclaim is that of interference with pro-
spective economic advantage. In order to recover, the trade
secret defendant is required to show the following elements:
(1) the existence of an economic relationship containing a
probability of future economic benefit; (2) the trade secret
plaintiff's knowledge of the existence of that relationship; (3)
intentional or negligent acts on the part of the trade secret
plaintiff designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual dis-
ruption of the relationship; and (5) damages to the trade se-
cret defendant proximately caused by the acts of the trade se-
cret plaintiff.
As a general rule, interference with prospective economic
advantage is actionable when the interference takes the form
of threats against the patrons of a business so that the busi-
92. See Dryden v. Tri-Valley Growers, 65 Cal. App. 3d 990, 135 Cal. Rptr. 720
(1977).
93. W. PROSSER, supra note 83, at 933.
94. Cf 4 B. WITKIN, supra note 9, at 2637 (employee contracts). Interview with
Bruce Spicer, Esq., Law Offices of Thomas E. Schatzel Santa Clara, Cal. (Feb. 2,
1983).
95. W. PROSSER, supra note 83, at 949-57; See generally Reiss v. Sanford, 47
Cal. App. 2d 244, 117 P.2d 694 (1941).
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ness is destroyed." Thus, a trade secret defendant must show
that if not for the tortious interference, there was a reasonable
probability that the contract or profit would have been ob-
tained.9 7 Since the trade secret defendant is typically a small
start-up company with limited resources,"8 its vulnerability to
any form of economic adversity makes the general risk of bus-
iness failure fairly high. Consequently, it is difficult for the
trade secret defendant, already in a precarious financial posi-
tion, to prove that its lost profits are due to the actions of the
trade secret plaintiff bringing a baseless lawsuit. 9" As a result,
the counterclaim for interference with prospective economic
advantage has not been of much use to attorneys in defending
companies faced with baseless lawsuits. 100
Instinctively, use of baseless litigation as a method of
harassing or eliminating an incipient competitor would seem
to qualify as an "unfair method of competition" that should
be specifically prohibited. However, although "[tihe legal con-
cept of unfair competition has evolved as a broad and flexible
doctrine," 101 courts have not yet recognized vexatious litiga-
tion as a specific act of unfair competition to be prohibited.10e
Instead, courts generally construe abusive litigation as a
wrong to be addressed under the tort causes of action for ma-
licious prosecution and abuse of process.10s As the following
discussion will illustrate, these latter causes of action have
also failed to provide the trade secret defendant with a mean-
96. The basic principle underlying this cause of action is that the right to en-
gage in an occupation or business as protected under both state and federal constitu-
tions is a valuable property right and an adjunct of personal liberty. 61 CAL. JUR. 3D,
supra note 18, at 40-41. See also Mach-Tronics, 316 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1963).
97. 4 B. WrrKIN, supra note 99, at 2647. See Campbell v. Rayburn, 129 Cal. 2d.
232, 234, 276 P.2d 671 (1954).
98. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
99. Interview with attorney Bruce Spicer, supra note 94.
100. Id. Mr. Spicer emphasized that the big difficulty with this cause of action
is the speculation involved in calculating lost profits, and the general requirement by
most courts that the claimant establish a connection between the lost business and
interference with particular transactions.
101. 61 CAL. JUR. 3D, supra note 18, at 27. See infra notes 170-79 and accompa-
nying text.
102. See generally 61 CAL. JUR. 3D, supra note 18, at 27-28.
103. See generally 6 CAL. JuR. 3D, supra note 18, at 197-205, 520-95 (1973).
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ingful counterclaim to a baseless lawsuit.
2. Tortious Litigation
The trade secret defendant faced with a baseless lawsuit
may also counterclaim against the trade secret plaintiff for
malicious prosecution or abuse of process. Both of these torts
are aimed at protecting the integrity of the judicial system by
imposing liability for its misuse.10 4 Theoretically, these causes
of action are tailored to prevent judicial abuses, such as the
one on which this comment focuses. In the context of trade
secret litigation, however, these torts in their present form fail
to act as sufficient deterrents. 0 5 Unfortunately, some plain-
tiffs initiate baseless trade secret claims with an underlying
intent to burden the defendant with a lawsuit rather than to
pursue the merit of the claim asserted.106
a. Malicious Prosecution
A malicious prosecution cause of action is comprised of
the following elements: (1) the absence of probable cause for
initiating the proceeding; (2) a primary motivation other than
seeking legal redress (referred to as "malicious intent"); (3)
termination of the proceeding in favor of the malicious prose-
cution plaintiff; and (4) actual injury or damage to the defen-
dant resulting from the malicious prosecution. 10 7 The tort, in
essence, is the unjustifiable instigation of the legal process to
merely vex or injure another.108
The attractiveness of malicious prosecution as a potential
counterclaim against vexatious trade secret litigation stems
from its focus on the intent of the plaintiff pursuing the base-
less claim.109 This is evidenced by the "absence of probable
cause" requirement. Probable cause is defined as "an honest
suspicion or belief on the part of the instigator of either a civil
104. 4 B. WITKIN, supra note 9, at 2539. See, e.g., Barquis v. Merchants Collec-
tion Ass'n of Oakland, 7 Cal. 3d 94, 104, 496 P.2d 817, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972).
105. Interview with attorney James Pooley, supra note 6. See also R. BORK,
supra note 19, at 348 for a discussion of how the price of litigation may be worth it to
the plaintiff seeking to delay a rival's entry into the market. The virtue of Bork's
discussion is that it points out how "predatory litigation" may be a cost-effective
technique for eliminating legitimate rivals.
106. R. BORK, supra note 19, at 348.
107. 6 CAL. JUR. 3D, supra note 18, at 524-25.
108. Id. at 521.
109. Id. at 548.
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or a criminal proceeding, founded on facts sufficiently strong
to warrant a belief on the part of the average person that
grounds exist for instigating proceedings."1 0
Unfortunately, however, the "favorable termination" re-
quirement"" places a severe burden on the malicious prosec-
tion plaintiff by preventing it from filing suit while the alleg-
edly baseless litigation is pending."' Because the greatest
burden on the defendant in a baseless lawsuit is usually the
cost of the litigation, the right to sue after going bankrupt de-
fending a baseless trade secret claim would be of little
value." s The usefulness of malicious prosecution as a counter-
claim for the trade secret defendant is further undermined by
the burden of proof which the trade secret defendant must
meet. Courts generally require the trade secret defendant to
demonstrate that the trade secret plaintiff's decision to liti-
gate was "clearly" unreasonable in order to establish a claim
for malicious prosecution." 4 Thus, the malicious prosecution
suit, although properly focused on the "intent" of the person
filing the questionable trade secret claim, is not particularly
useful as a counterclaim for defendants.
b. Abuse of Process
Another attack on abusive litigation is the tort claim for
abuse of process. The essential elements of the cause of action
for abuse of process are: (1) that the defendant had an ulte-
rior motive or purpose in the use of the process, (2) that the
defendant acted wilfully in using the process in an improper
manner in the regular conduct of the proceeding, and (3) that
damage to the plaintiff resulted from the irregularity in the
use of the process."'
Abuse of process, unlike malicious prosecution, does not
require lack of probable cause in commencing the action or a
110. Id.
111. One reason for the rule requiring favorable termination is that otherwise
the complaining party might secure a recovery for bringing an action that the court
entertaining such cause might later find to have been well brought. Furthermore, the
rule prevents a collateral attack on the judgment of a duly constituted court or on the
determination of an administrative body acting in a quasi-judicial manner. 6 CAL.
JUR. 3D, supra note 103, at 535-36.
112. Balmer, supra note 20, at 555.
113. Id. at 556.
114. W. PRossER, aupra note 83, at 841-47.
115. 6 CAL. JUR. 3D, supra note 18, at 200.
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favorable termination of the proceeding.11 6
[T]he gist of the tort of abuse of process is not commenc-
ing an action, or causing process to issue without justifica-
tion, but in misusing or misapplying process that is justi-
fied in itself, for an end other than that which it was
designed to accomplish; the purpose for which process is
used, once it is issued, is the only thing of importance."
The element of improper purpose requires the trade se-
cret defendant to show coercion on the part of the trade secret
plaintiff in order to obtain a collateral advantage. 1 8 For ex-
ample, there may be an actionable abuse of process where it
can be shown that the plaintiff filed the trade secret claim in
order to coerce the defendant into entering into certain busi-
ness arrangements with it.' Further, the element of a wilful
act involving an improper use of the process in the regular
conduct of the proceeding may consist of a threat made by the
plaintiff to coerce the defendant in order to obtain a collateral
advantage, or in the use of process for an improper or unau-
thorized purpose.1 20
In most successful counterclaims for abuse of process, the
trade secret defendant's recovery is limited to attorney's fees
and costs incurred in the abusive lawsuit.' As discussed ear-
lier, the losses suffered by the defendant as a result of the
lawsuit often include a loss of existing and potential business.
116. Id. at 198-99.
117. Id. at 199.
118. Id. at 201. For example, in Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n of Oak-
land, 7 Cal. 3d 94, 496 P.2d 817, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972), the court found for defen-
dant on a claim for abuse of process where a collection agency wilfully and knowingly
filed actions in an improper county pursuant to statutorily inadequate pleadings, for
the ulterior purpose of impairing the defendant's rights to defend the suits, in order
to coerce inequitable settlements and default judgments. Applying this concept to the
context of abusive trade secret litigation, an abuse of process action might lie where
the trade secret plaintiff obtains a restrictive preliminary injunction against the trade
secret defendant and then engages in settlement negotioations, offering to drop the
suit in exchange for the trade secret defendant's agreement not to expand in a partic-
ular market. Balmer, supra note 20, at 557.
119. 6 CAL. JUR. 3D, supra note 103, at 202.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 206, where it is stated that:
"One who uses legal process . . . against another to accomplish a pur-
pose for which it is not designed is liable to the other for the pecuniary
loss caused thereby." But see 14 CAL. JUR. 2D 682-83, 697-700 (1954)
(discussing the uncertainty and speculation with regard to damages to
profits of a newly established business).
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Consequently, the recovery of attorney's fees and costs leaves
the defendant without compensation for its losses.' 22
As with all torts, punitive damages are available when op-
pression, fraud or malice is shown. 123 Although recovery of pu-
nitive damages in some cases would compensate the trade se-
cret defendant for otherwise incompensable injuries, punitive
damages are not favored by the law, and courts will allow
them only with the greatest caution.124 As a result of the fac-
tors mentioned above, the cause of action for abuse of process
has not been regarded as an aggressive counterclaim by trade
secret defendants.1 25
3. Antitrust
In asserting a counterclaim for antitrust, the defendant
must allege that the plaintiff has violated either section 1126 or
section 2127 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. In asserting an an-
titrust counterclaim under section 1, the trade secret defen-
dant is required to prove the existence of a "contract, combi-
nation, . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade.' 2 8 In essence,
this language requires the trade secret defendant to establish
three elements: (1) an agreement; (2) made between two or
more parties; and (3) the net effect of the agreement being an
unreasonable restraint on competition.
129
122. Interview with attorney James Pooley, supra note 6.
123. Thompson, An Outline of 23 California Common Law Business Torts, 13
PAC. L.J. 1, 15.
124. Galane, Proving Punitive Damages in Business Tort Litigation, 2 LrrIA-
TION 24 (1976). To illustrate, a common practice among courts is to instruct the jury
that it may award punitive damages if it finds that the defendant's conduct was out-
rageous and evidenced "evil motives. . . reckless indifference to the rights of others."
The assessment of punitive damages is then left to the discretion of the jury. Mailer
& Roberts, Punitive Damages: Towards a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS L. J.
639, 663-64. In practice, juries given this type of instruction are reluctant to award
punitive damages because of the extremely negative connotations involved. Interview
with attorney James Pooley, supra note 6.
125. Interview with Thomas Schatzel, Esq., Law Offices of Thomas Schatzel,
Santa Clara, Cal. (Feb. 5, 1983).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
128. 15 U.S.C. § 1 provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. .. ."
129. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 153-55 (1977). Certain
types of agreements are afforded per se treatment under the antitrust laws whereby
the antitrust plaintiff is not required to prove an anti-competitive effect. These in-
clude price-fixing agreements, market division agreements, group boycotts, and tying
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One problem in establishing a violation under this section
is the prerequisite of establishing the existence of an agree-
ment between two or more parties. The trade secret defen-
dant would be precluded from recovering under section 1
where the anti-competitive scheme involving a baseless trade
secret suit is engineered by a single entity. 30
A second problem confronted by trade secret defendants
in counterclaiming under section 1 is the high standard used
by courts in determining the existence of an unreasonable re-
straint on trade. In making this determination, the courts con-
sider the purpose of the agreement, in conjunction with the
market power and economic strength of the parties to the
agreement.'31 In finding agreements to be "unreasonable",
courts usually require a showing that the restraint was "so
substantial as to affect either market prices or commercial
freedom.'' 2
Alternatively, the trade secret defendant can assert an
antitrust counterclaim under section 2 of the Sherman Act,
which prohibits a "monopolization" or "attempt to monopo-
lize" an industry." The elements for a section 2 cause of ac-
tion are: (1) the antitrust defendant's specific intent to mo-
nopolize a certain market and (2) a "dangerous probability"
that the attempt will succeed.'34 Conduct from which specific
agreements. Id. In the context of vexatious litigation, however, most agreements fall
under the "rule of reason" analysis, which requires the court to examine their pur-
pose and net competitive effect. Id. at 182-97.
130. Id. at 152-65.
131. Id. at 186-96.
132. Miller v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 339 F. Supp. 1296, 1298 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
This case involved the judicial treatment of overly restrictive employment covenants
alleged to be "unreasonable restraints on trade" in violation of § 1. Nonetheless, the
factors weighed by the court in finding unreasonable restraints in the context of em-
ployment covenants bear a striking resemblance to those considered in § 1 counter-
claims to baseless trade secret suits. For example, in both contexts courts require a
showing that the antitrust defendants possess a substantial market share, and also
consider the intensity of competition within the industry. Alders v. AFA Corp. of
Florida, 353 F. Supp. 654 (S.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd., 490 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1974). The
high standard imposed by the courts in determining unreasonable restraints of trade
in the context of employment covenants is indicative of the overall reluctance of the
judiciary to allow antitrust claims as defensive measures. See also Comment, supra
note 60, at 314.
133. 15 U.S.C. § 2 provides in pertinent part: "Every person who shall monopo-
lize or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or per-
sons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states, or
with foreign nations shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... .
134. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 129, at 134.
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intent to obtain a monopoly can be inferred must be activity
that harms competitors and lacks any business or social justi-
fication. 185 Dangerous probability of success can be shown by
a trade secret plaintiff's substantial market share. 16
In many instances the requirement of establishing that
the trade secret plaintiff filing the baseless lawsuit has sub-
stantial market power is particularly burdensome to the trade
secret defendant."' Frequently, the plaintiff instigating the
vexatious trade secret suit does not represent a dominant per-
centage of the market in question, but does have sufficient
resouces to defend the lawsuit without harming its business
operations. 13 8
A further limitation on the use of antitrust as a counter-
claim by a trade secret defendant, however, has been the
emergence of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine developed from two landmark decisions of
the United States Supreme Court: Eastern Railroad Presi-
dents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.139 and United
Mine Workers v. Pennington."1 0 "In essence, the doctrine
carves out an exception to the antitrust laws where the alleged
anticompetitive behavior is an attempt to influence govern-
ment action. 1 41 Because of the paramount importance of the
135. Id. at 135-36.
136. Id. at 137-40. Although courts are in disagreement as to how substantial
market share is calculated, the majority view is that expressed in Walker Process
Equip. v. Food Machinery and Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965). In Walker, the
court stated the test that: (1) the relevant market in which the antitrust defendant
was operating had to be defined and (2) its power in that market determined, before
a finding of dangerous probability could be made. Id. at 177.
137. For example, in Kobe, 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
837 (1952), the trade secret defendant was required to show that there was a "unifica-
tion and concentration of power and control over a commodity." Id. at 423. See supra
notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
138. Interview with attorney James Pooley, supra note 6.
139. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
140. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
141. Balmer, supra note 20, at 531. Balmer notes the following:
In Noerr, forty-one truck operators and their trade association sued a
group of railroads, a public relations firm retained by the railroads, and
an association of the railroads' presidents, claiming that the defendants
had conducted a publicity campaign aimed at the passage of legislation
which would benefit the railroad and harm the truckers. . . . [The Su-
preme] Court recognized that to construe the Sherman Act to impair the
first amendment right to petition the government would raise serious
constitutional questions.
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first amendment right to petition the government, such activ-
ity is immune from antitrust scrutiny.14 2 The Court in Noerr
cautioned, however, that not all attempts to influence the gov-
ernment are immune from antitrust liability: "There may be
situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed
toward influencing government action, is a mere sham to
cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to inter-
fere directly with the business relationships of a competitor
and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified. 4 '
Although Noerr and Pennington dealt with the right to
petition the legislative and executive branches of government
respectively, the Supreme Court brought the third branch of
government, the judiciary, within the scope of doctrine in Cal-
ifornia Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited.144 In ad-
dition, the "sham exception" dictum of Noerr became more
firmly established in this leading case. 45
The development of the sham exception to Noerr illus-
trates the judiciary's recognition of the potential anti-compe-
tive effects of baseless lawsuits. One of the problems faced by
the trade -secret defendant in counterclaiming under the sham
exception to Noerr, however, is the current uncertainty as to
the prerequisites for its invocation. 46 In addition, the defen-
142. Id. Balmer suggests the following:
The rights to petition the government for redress of grievances and to
associate for that purpose are closely related to other first amendment
rights of expression. . . .Since constitutional rights supercede conflict-
ing statutes, litigation and other petitioning activity is immune from
Sherman Act liability wherever it is protected by the first amendment.
Id. at 546. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-23, 16-11,
16-43 (1978).
143. 365 U.S. at 144.
144. 404 U.S. 508 (1972). In Trucking Unlimited, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants had instituted proceedings "with or without probable cause, and regard-
less of the merits of the cases." The Court held that the indiscriminate instigation of
lawsuits on the part of competitors could be antitrust violations if they involved
"abuse" of the judicial processes. The Court further specified that such "abuse"
might be found if the defendants by their actions effectively closed "the machinery of
the agencies and the Courts" to their competitors or if there was a "pattern of base-
less, repetitive claims" involved. In reaching its conclusion, the Court stated that "the
fact that such suits were baseless is evidence that they were instituted in order to
drive a competitor out of business rather than to assert a legitimate legal right." Id.
at 513.
145. Balmer, supra note 20, at 532.
146. Id. at 535. For example, lower courts continue to differ over whether the
antitrust plaintiff must show that numerous baseless suits have been filed, or whether
a single sham suit is sufficient to invoke the Noerr sham exception. Id. at 535-36. For
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dant has the burden of proving that the trade secret plaintiff's
actions, which ostensibly appear as petitioning activity, are
not genuine efforts to influence governmental action, but
rather are nothing more that an attempt to interfere with the
business relationships of a competitor. " "
Moreover, even when the trade secret defendant proves
that the lawsuit is baseless, it does not in itself establish lia-
bility. The defendant must still prove the usual elements of
an antitrust violation under sections 1 or 2." 8
One of the major incentives to litigate under the antitrust
laws is the prospect of recovering treble damages.' " In order
to recover treble damages, however, the trade secret defen-
dant must prove that the trade secret plaintiff's violation of
the antitrust law caused an injury to the defendant's business
or property.8 0 A business' record of past profits is often the
best evidence it has to prove loss of profits.15' Unfortunately,
the trade secret defendant is frequently a new business with
no record of past profits. Hence, it is much more difficult for
the new venture to make out a claim for loss of profits with
sufficient certainty. 52 Moreover, the damage suffered by the
defendant as a result of the baseless lawsuit often consists of
intangible items such as the loss of financing opportunities or
the loss of an opportunity to enter a particular market. 5"
However, the courts appear reluctant to award damages for
the deprivation of an opportunity. 54
example, in Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammed, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir.
1978), the court held that a single sham petition may constitute an antitrust viola-
tion. In contrast, in Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301
(E.D. Mich. 1979), the court stated that repetitive sham petitions must be shown.
147. Clipper Express v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 674 F.2d
1252 (9th Cir. 1982).
148. Id. at 1269.
149. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), provides this relief to
any person who has been "injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws ...... The intent of Congress in providing for the
treble damage recovery was twofold, namely, to create an incentive for private civil
enforcement, and to establish a punishment significant enough to act as a deterrent
to the prohibited behavior. Cf. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 129, at 770 (the effect of
treble damages).
150. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 129, at 785. Damages must be established with
reasonable certainty and may not be based on mere speculation and conjecture. Id.
151. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES 107 (1935).
152. Id.
153. R. BORK, supra note 19, at 348.
154. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 151, at 104-05.
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The potential anti-competitive abuse which is created by
trade secret litigation is not easily resolved. One possible ap-
proach in dealing with the problem of baseless trade secret
lawsuits is to instigate greater judicial control over the discov-
ery process.155 The focus of this comment, however, is directed
towards the creation of a defensive counterclaim which would
significantly increase the risk to a plaintiff bringing a baseless
trade secret claim. Accordingly, the following discussion ex-
plores policy considerations which support the creation of ad-
ditional measures to deter the use of the litigation process as
an anticompetitive business tool.
V. GENERAL POLICIES SUPPORTING THE CREATION OF A NEW
BUSINESS TORT
A. The Policies Behind the Antitrust Laws
The intent behind the antitrust laws is "to establish a re-
gime of competition as the fundamental principle governing
commerce in this country." 1 " However, as pointed out by the
United States Supreme Court in Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States,1 5 7 "we cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to pro-
mote competition through the protection of small, viable, lo-
cally owned businesses."15 This concern with protecting small
businesses from predators in the marketplace has been a con-
troversial, yet continuing, aspect of antitrust policy.159 "Also
surfacing at times is a concern for fairness-the idea that the
antitrust laws are intended to set equitable rules for the com-
petitive game, as well as to promote the game itself."' 10
The emergence of the sham exception to Noerr-Pen-
nington61 serves as a primary illustration of the concern for
fairness as an overriding objective behing the antitrust laws.
Moreover, sham litigation aimed at harassing or eliminating a
competitor can have an immediate and severe impact on com-
155. Interview with attorney James Pooley, supra note 6.
156. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 (1978).
157. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
158. Id. at 344.
159. Balmer, supra note 20, at 553, See, e.g., Schwartz, "Justice" and Other
Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. Rv. 1076 (1979).
160. Balmer, supra note 20, at 553. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
337 U.S. 293, 315 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
161. See supra notes 139-47 and accompanying text.
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petition."' By striking directly at a competitor via the judicial
process, it is possible for a firm to cause more harm to compe-
tition in the same market than it might through exclusive-
dealing, predatory pricing, or other frequently discussed anti-
competitive activities.0 8 This is especially true when the tar-
get of the lawsuit is a small company.16" More significantly in
terms of the antitrust laws, an established company can in-
hibit competition, reap excessive profits, and retard innova-
tion by preventing or delaying the entry of new firms into the
market.'"
The policies underlying the antitrust laws clearly support
a vigorous attack on vexatious lawsuits such as those de-
scribed in the trade secret area.166 Increasing the risk to a
plaintiff pursuing a baseless trade secret claim would decrease
the use of such lawsuits as an anti-competitive tool and help
insure more meaningful protection for smaller competitors.
Thus, four fundamental policies behind the antitrust laws, (1)
prevention of large concentrations of economic and market
power; (2) the promotion of the competitive process; (3) the
maintenance of a fair standard of business conduct; and (4)
desirable economic results, would all be furthered by increas-
ing the liability for baseless litigation in a trade secret
claim.'67
B. The Policies Behind the Unfair Competition Laws
Unlike antitrust law, "unfair competition law restrains
the forces of competition by circumscribing the boundaries of
162. R. BORK, supra note 19, at 348-49.
163. Balmer, supra note 20, at 553; R. BORK, supra note 19, at 357.
164. Balmer, supra note 20, at 553.
While the additional costs of doing business imposed on a smaller firm
by a dominant firm's predatory pricing or territorial allocation policy
may reduce profits and eventually squeeze the small firm out of the
market, the added costs bear at least some relation to the firm's sales or
share of the market. . . .Predatory litigation, on the other hand, im-
poses high fixed costs, which are independent of a firm's market
position.
Id.
165. Balmer, supra note 20, at 554.
166. One author has asserted that more predation is accomplished via litigation
than through below-cost pricing. R. BORK, supra note 19, at 357.
167. Ferrill, The Pick-Barth Doctrine: Should Unfair Competition Belong
Under the Sherman Act?, 31 BAYLOR L. Rav. 253, 257 (citing C. KAYSEN AND D. Tur-
NER, ANTITRUST POLICY 11-20 (1959)).
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acceptable competitive behavior."'"e Nonetheless, the devel-
opment of the unfair competition causes of action recognizing
unlawful forms of interference with economic relations illus-
trates a concern with promoting fairness in the marketplace
similar to that underlying the antitrust laws.16 9
In examining the policies behind the unfair competition
laws, it must be pointed out that the definition of unfair com-
petition is as amorphous as that of trade secrets. Unlike the
antitrust laws, which are embodied primarily in federal and
state statutes, the unfair competition laws are largely crea-
tures of common law.170 In attempting to find guidelines for
unfair competition, judges have referred to such things as
"the rules of fair play," acts which are "contrary to good con-
science," "means which shock judicial sensibilities," "the
morals of the marketplace," "the decent thing to do in trade,"
and "principles of honesty and fair dealing. 17 1 Thus, al-
though hardly a clear definition, it can be said that commer-
cial morality is the touchstone for unfair competition law.172
"Unfair competition law has developed as a flexible legal
instrument to control the excesses of a market system in the
throes of constant adjustment as it adapts itself to economic,
political and social changes. 17' Accordingly, apart from the
specifically labelled forms of unfair competition, such as mis-
appropriation of trade secrets and interference with contrac-
tual relations, the law also recognizes a residual equitable
power in judges to create remedies in new situations, whether
the judge labels what he is prohibiting as "unfair competi-
tion" or just "tort. 1 7 4 The standard of fairness in competition
has been arrived at through a long process of case-by-case de-
cisions that characterizes the common law today. A particu-
larly appropriate example of this power is the California Leg-
islature's enactment of Civil Code section 336917 enjoining
168. McBrearty, supra note 7, at 421.
169. But see McBrearty, supra note 7, at 421.
170. J. MCCARTHY, TADEMAtKS AND UNFAIR COMPErTrON 17 (1973).
171. Id. at 13.
172. Id. at 22.
173. Id. at 18-19.
174. Id. at 17.
175. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369 (West 1970 & Supp. 1983) provides:
1. Neither specific nor preventive relief can be granted to enforce
a penalty or forfeiture in any case, nor to enforce a penal law, except in
a case of nuisance or as otherwise provided by law.
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unfair competition and the broad interpretation given this
statute in Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n. "
In Barquis the California Supreme Court found a collec-
tion agency's practice of knowingly and wilfully filing actions
in improper counties to be an unlawful business practice in
violation of California Civil Code section 3369.17 Central to
the Barquis court's conclusion was the case of American Phil-
atelic Soc. v. Claibourne175 where the court observed: "when a
scheme is evolved which on its face violates the fundamental
rules of honesty and fair dealing, a court of equity is not im-
potent to frustrate its consummation because the scheme is an
original one. '17  Thus, it is well established that the policies
underlying the unfair competition laws support the creation of
a new cause of action designed to deal with the problem of
vexatious trade secret litigation as an unfair business practice.
C. Policies Underlying the Tortious Litigation Laws
The interest in freedom from unjustifiable litigation re-
ceives protection in causes of action known as malicious pros-
ecution and abuse of process."' Although both are based on
the same general policy, namely, the desire to eliminate tor-
tious litigation, these two torts are aimed at the elimination of
two very distinct forms of abuse.
Malicious prosecution actions are designed to prevent
2. Any person performing or proposing to perform an act of unfair
competition within this State may be enjoined in any court of compe-
tent jurisdiction.
3. As used in this section, unfair competition shall mean and in-
clude unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practice and unfair, untrue
or misleading advertising and any act denounced by Business and Pro-
fessions Code Sections 17500 to 17535, inclusive.
4. As used in this section, the term person shall mean and include
natural persons, corporations, firms, partnerships, joint stock companies,
associations and other organizations of persons.
5. Actions for injunction under this section may be prosecuted by
the Attorney General or any district attorney in this State in the name
of the people of the State of California upon their own complaint or
upon the complaint of any board, officer, person, corporation or associa-
tion or by any person acting for the interests of itself, its members or
the general public.
176. 7 Cal. 3d 94, 496 P.2d 817, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745.
177. Id.
178. 3 Cal. 2d 689, 46 P.2d 135 (1935).
179. Id. at 698-99, 46 P.2d at 140.
180. W. PROSSER, supra note 83, at 834.
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fraud and deceit in the context of the litigation process.18' In
contrast, "[a]buse of process rests on the theory that no legiti-
mate social interest is served by allowing the employment of
even meritorious litigation by the defendant when his real aim
is a nonadjudicatory objective."''
The careful analogies made by commentators to malicious
prosecution and abuse of process in analyzing the Noerr-Pen-
nington sham exception'88 illustrates that inherent in the poli-
cies behind these laws is a desire to prevent the use of the
litigation process as an anti-competitive tool. Therefore, it can
safely be said that the principles behind the tortious litigation
laws provide further support for the instigation of a more vig-
orous attack on the problem of baseless trade secret claims.
VI. PROPOSAL FOR A MORE VIGOROUS ATTACK ON VEXATIOUS
TRADE SECRET LITIGATION
As this comment has emphasized, the present defensive
tactics available to defendants fail to act as sufficient deter-
rents against baseless trade secret litigation. Clearly, the poli-
cies underlying the antitrust, unfair competition, and tortious
litigation laws support the conclusion that the use of the base-
less trade secret claim to prevent or delay a legitimate com-
petitor from entering the market is an unacceptable business
tactic.'" Accordingly, the courts and legislatures are granted
broad discretion to protect against any business practice they
find unfair.'8 5
Given this discretion, this comment proposes that a new
cause of action be delineated under the unfair competition
laws. The underlying purpose of the cause of action would be
to deter the use of baseless trade secret claims as a method of
preventing or delaying new competitors from entering the
market. The following elements for this new cause of action
are proposed: (1) lack of probable cause for the instigation or
pursuit of the trade secret misappropriation suit; (2) the exis-
tence of an ulterior purpose in pursuing the trade secret suit;
181. Note, Limiting The Antitrust Immunity For Concerted Attempts To In-
fluence Courts and Adjudicatory Agencies: Analogies For Malicious Prosecution and
Abuse of Process, 86 HAAv. L. Rzv. 715, 728-29 (1973).
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Balmer, supra note 20, at 555-57.
184. See supra notes 156-83 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
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and (3) improper acts by the trade secret plaintiff during the
course of the trade secret litigation which result in harm to
the trade secret defendant.
The theory behind the first two elements, lack of proba-
ble cause and collateral purpose, is to make "intent" the key
focus of the cause of action. To illustrate the necessity of a
focus on intent, the problem in many baseless trade secret
claims is that a certain level of discovery is often necessary
before it can really be determined whether there is probable
cause to believe a trade secret exists.186 The abuse often oc-
curs when, after conducting a certain amount of initial discov-
ery, the plaintiff finds there is no real merit to his trade secret
claim. Nonetheless, the trade secret plaintiff continues to pur-
sue the claim as a tactic to tie up and drain an incipient com-
petitor's resources. 8 ' In this situation the ulterior purpose can
be inferred from the continued pursuit of extensive discovery
motions after a determination that the claim has no merit.
Further, "probable cause" is an important ingredient in a
cause of action against a plaintiff bringing a baseless suit be-
cause the plaintiff should only be deterred from pursuing a
meritless suit.
The purpose behind the third element, an improper act
by the trade secret plaintiff during the course of the litigation,
is to provide an additional basis for inferring the existence of
an ulterior purpose. This act would not be limited to an im-
proper use of the judicial process, as under abuse of process.
Rather, it would include any act by the trade secret plaintiff
which could be deemed an improper and unfair business prac-
tice under the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.
For example, liability would attach where the trade secret
plaintiff contacts the trade secret defendant's potential cus-
tomers and suppliers and provides false or misleading infor-
mation regarding the trade secret claim and thereby dissuades
them from dealing with the defendant.188
In addition to these elements, there are two additional
features of this cause of action which are critical to its poten-
tial as a deterrent to abusive trade secret litigation. First, the
new cause of action should be litigated simultaneously as a
186. Hutter, Pretrial, supra note 14, at 43.
187. Interview with attorney James Pooley, supra note 6.
188. This hypothetical is based on the factual situation in Mach-Tronica v.
Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1963). See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
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counterclaim to the baseless trade secret cause of action. This
will assure the trade secret defendant a meaningful remedy,
that is, the chance to recover its losses before going bankrupt
defending a baseless lawsuit.
Second, an award of punitive damages under this cause of
action should be based on a test balancing the various com-
peting interests involved. ' 89 Under the current traditional
scheme, the test for awarding punitive damages focuses exclu-
sively on the acts and intent of the trade secret plaintiff. For
example, the current practice in many courts is to instruct the
jury to award punitive damages only where it finds that the
defendant's conduct was outrageous and evidenced "evil mo-
tives or . .. reckless indifference to the rights of others."1 90
Not surprisingly, juries have been reluctant to award punitive
damages when given such an instruction.
In lieu of the current approach to punitive damages, a
test is proposed which, in addition to examining the conduct
and intent of the trade secret plaintiff, would instruct the jury
to consider the social interests involved.""' Thus, the jury
would balance the employee's interest in economic freedom
and mobility against the employer's right to protect its inven-
tions and society's interest in encouraging innovation. In addi-
tion, the jury would consider the interest in promoting private
civil enforcement and the value of punitive damages in acting
as a deterrent to undesirable business practices. 92
One of the merits underlying punitive damages is the
flexibility allowed in determining awards. The jury is allowed
to consider the financial status of the defendant in determin-
ing the amount of the award."" The importance of this factor
is that it eliminates any profit incentive behind the pursuit of
a vexatious lawsuit to eliminate a competitor. The potential
liability in punitive damages can be made to outweigh the
benefit involved in eliminating or harassing a competitor.
189. In this area punitive damages are crucial in providing incentives for private
civil enforcement of serious misconduct and in expressing society's disapproval of un-
desirable conduct and deterring such conduct in the future. Mailer & Roberts, supra
note 124, at 648.
190. See supra note 124.
191. See supra note 7.
192. While the "balancing test" suggested herein is original, it is based in part
on the ideas advanced in an article suggesting an alternative approach to punitive
damages. See Mailer & Roberts, supra note 124, at 666-69.
193. Id. at 668.
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Finally, it is important to illustrate how this proposed
cause of action will circumvent the limitations inherent in ex-
isting counterclaims available to the trade secret defendant.
First, the punitive damages available under the proposed
cause of action will provide a recovery that will adequately
compensate the trade secret defendant for all its losses with-
out imposing on it the burden of proving "substantial market
power" or an "unreasonable restraint on trade" under the an-
titrust laws. Second, it will provide recovery for intangible
losses such as the loss of an opportunity to enter a market, a
loss for which the trade secret defendant is not compensated
under current damage laws. Third, by focusing its elements
specifically on the elimination of predatory baseless litigation,
the proposed cause of action circumvents the current limita-
tions to recovery under both existing business torts and the
claim for abuse of process. These include the requirement of
identifying the loss of particular transactions under trade def-
amation, the need to establish the existence of a contract
under interference with contractual relations, the problems of
proof involved in establishing the existence of a "prospective
economic advantage," and the requirement under abuse of
process that the abusive act in question be the misuse of a
specific form of legal process, such as an injunction. Finally,
the availability of this cause of action as a simultaneously liti-
gated counterclaim eliminates the inherent problem under
malicious prosecution of providing recovery when it is no
longer meaningful to the trade secret defendant.
VII. CONCLUSION
As noted by some commentators, "predation through the
misuse of governmental processes appears to be a common
but little-noticed phenomenon.' As this comment has
pointed out, the above observation is particularly true with
regard to baseless trade secret lawsuits. Much of this misuse is
unreachable by law because of limitations in existing causes of
action available to a trade secret defendant. Nevertheless,
much predation of this type can be halted.
Adoption of the proposed cause of action will help elimi-
nate baseless litigation in the trade secret context. By identi-
194. R. BORK, supra note 19, at 364.
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fying those elements of a trade secret claim that are without
merit, trade secret defendants have a viable method of pro-
tecting their new businesses. In so doing, we can ensure the
integrity and efficiency of the judicial process.
Elizabeth Smith

